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Abstract-This project aims to visualise packet counts 
filtered by iptables at the network layer, and allows for 
performing network forensics in a distributed 
environment. For example, anomalies such as bandwidth 
spikes and port scans are exposed and quickly 
identifiable. Naturally, there are a host of tools which 
already perform this function. The twist with this project 
is that it should operate on a scalable cloud 
infrastructure—Nimbula Director is used as a test bed to 
this end. Intrusion Detection Systems and full-blown 
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
solutions have their merits but are often too bulky. 
Cloud infrastructures rely principally on correctly 
configured firewalls for network-layer security. As such, 
Firegaze is a prototype solution which serves as a 
supplement to network layer security by visualizing 
firewall activity; it does not perform any analysis, but 
rather leaves it up to the system administrator to identify 
anomalous activity. Typically, log files are only needed 
once an incident occurs, or in the event of system failure. 
The idea behind Firegaze was to provide a solution for 
visualizing iptables logs in real-time, or on a historical 
basis. The challenge of doing this in an environment 
which scales has influenced the implementation greatly; 
logs are propagated among nodes in a hierarchical 
manner, and logs are inserted into a sharded MongoDB 
database according to a pre-aggregated reports pattern. 
Index Terms—cloud, logging, firewall,visualisation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Logs provide a wealth of information on system activity, 
but are often ignored as system administration or 
development is prioritized in an enterprise environment. 
There is a growing need to utilize the available information 
and present it concisely, and to do so on a massive scale.  
 Log analysis can be decidedly valuable for optimising 
system performance, reporting, profiling, and security. 
However, one of the difficult challenges encountered in the 
field of log analysis is the distributed nature of log-
generating components [24]. In the cloud, it is non-trivial to 
monitor events based on logs which originate from multiple 
sources. This is especially relevant when one considers the 
value of logs in a security context: an incident typically takes 
place on a single node, or on a small subset of nodes, within 
a network. Nevertheless, the benefits for addressing the 
problem are clear; Oliner et al. [25] asserts that logs can help 
to reconstruct events following a security incident, or 
identify anomalous activity. 
 In particular, network security in a cloud environment can 
be strengthened by providing a detailed account of firewall 
activity, provided that relevant logs are taken into account. 
Firewall logs contain evidence of anomalous activity, and 
can be used as forensic evidence during event 
reconstruction. This project addresses the need for large-
scale management, processing, and visualisation of Linux 
firewall logs; a subset of system logs generated by the well-
known iptables application. Nimbula Director [21], a 
proprietary cloud platform, is chosen to provide basic 
infrastructure for deployment and testing within a distributed 
environment. 
II. LITERATURE SURVEY
The literature survey highlights works related to scalable 
log processing, and the use of firewall logs to improve 
network security.  
A. Log Processing 
There is a growing desire to address the need of handling 
log analysis in distributed systems and cloud-based 
environments. Wei et al. [19] advocate the use of a NoSQL 
solution (MongoDB [5]) for log storage, aggregation, and 
query purposes. It optimizes border bandwidth distribution 
among ISPs, and provides network traces based on logs. 
Aggregation of IP-group traﬃc is done at 10-minute 
intervals, using MongoDB’s MapReduce capability. 
MapReduce-based log analysis for system anomaly detection 
has been explored by Liu et al. [14]. Hadoop’s [2] 
MapReduce framework is used as a basis for log analysis, 
with separate clusters for data aggregation and analysis. 
A few examples in industry are putting these technologies 
into practice. Loggly [4], a San Fransisco startup company, 
provides a cloud based “logging as a service” platform 
which supports a scalable way of managing customer logs. 
Loggly’s servers process and index customer logs, and aims 
to provide application intelligence and ease of 
troubleshooting. Apache Solr [1] serves as Loggly’s search 
platform, and MongoDB is used to store aggregation 
statistics such as log counts. All log visualizations are 
produced by querying MongoDB, and text searches are 
directed to Solr. Importantly, logs themselves are persisted 
on the filesystem, while aggregation results are stored in the 
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database. Both Solr and MongoDB scale horizontally, and 
so the architecture proves eﬀective. Splunk [22] is another 
example of a company which indexes customer logs, 
allowing powerful search functionality and visualizations. 
While Splunk’s architecture is mostly custom-built, it makes 
use of the MapReduce framework and a time-series 
database. 
An important point should be made that while the 
MapReduce framework is highly scalable, it is largely a 
batch-oriented paradigm. For this reason, real-time analytics, 
monitoring, and alerts may be slower if they depend on the 
MapReduce model. 
Visualization of log statistics is the most important part of 
conveying the information that system administrators are 
interested in. Aptly summarized, “a picture is worth a 
thousand log entries” [15]. Ganglia is an example of a 
distributed monitoring system for clusters and grids. It uses 
RRDtool [6] to display eﬀective time-series data pertaining 
to network traﬃc, CPU utilization, running processes, and 
other metrics. Moreover, Loggly’s solution supports charting 
data with Highcharts. 
The tools discussed thus far make use of custom 
visualizations, but all maintain a web front-end to display 
appropriate charts; these form part of a centralized 
monitoring solution. 
B. Distributed Network Security 
PSAD (Port Scan Attack Detector) is a Linux tool that 
performs intrusion detection and log analysis using iptable 
logs. PSAD operates on the central idea that a lot of data 
relating to intrusion detection may be gleaned from firewall 
logs, since log entries maintain fields of almost every aspect 
of packet headers. PSAD detects anomalous activities that 
manifest themselves at the network and transport layer [18]. 
Moreover, PSAD can be configured to send e-mail alerts 
when a threat is detected. The major limitations with PSAD 
is that it does not cater for a distributed environment, nor 
does it provide visualization of iptables logs. Consequently, 
the wealth of information exposed from fine-grained detail 
of firewall logs go to waste. 
Snort is another popular intrusion detection system (IDS), 
and interacts with a firewall by applying rulesets. Brennan 
[8] and Kumar et al. [13] support the idea that IDS such as 
Snort can be used in a distributed environment. Individual 
nodes are set up to detect suspicious activity using Snort, 
and alerts are propagated to centralized nodes on the grid. 
As with PSAD, this idea does not give an oversight of the 
entire cluster, nor does it allow inspection of firewall activity 
by visualization. 
While IDS are not obsolete, Gartner [16] makes a valid 
point that “Firewalls are the most eﬀective defense against 
cyberintruders” and that enterprises are plagued by false-
positives generated by IDS. The emphasis is that investment 
should be on “firewalls that block attacks, rather than alert 
administrators to them.” Indeed, an IDS should not be a tool 
that is relied on to fend oﬀ attacks, but as a supplement to a 
correctly configured firewall. It is therefore all the more 
worthwhile for the system administrator to have an 
indication of traﬃc activity at the firewall level, rather than 
relying on black-box IDS analysis. 
III. DESIGN
A. Overview 
Management, processing, and visualization of firewall 
logs in a distributed environment is demonstrated by 
implementing a prototype logging tool, henceforth referred 
to as Firegaze, on Nimbula Director. This entails making use 
of scalable technologies and architectures, as the number of 
nodes may order in the tens of thousands. The goal is to 
provide a scalable solution which provides an overview of 
firewall activity on a fine-grained level: counts of data 
packets associated with IPs and ports that pass through the 
firewall on a minutely, hourly, daily, weekly, and monthly 
basis. This information forms a foundation for anomaly 
detection and log visualisation. 
Serving as a supplement to a properly configured firewall, 
the tool assists the user in identifying anomalies based on 
packet counts and port destinations. System administrators 
benefit from charts detailing real-time metrics of firewall 
traﬃc, contributing to security intelligence. In addition to 
real-time updates, the user is also able to query and observe 
traﬃc in the past, at varying granularities. 
Filtering can be performed on IP addresses via regular 
expressions, aﬀording flexibility. This allows system 
administrators to pinpoint precisely the traﬃc behaviour that 
they’re interested in—something not readily available when 
unprocessed logs reside on a local file system. As a final 
feature, a history of raw logs are archived on the distributed 
file system. The tool is designed for two purposes: to 
meaningfully persist firewall log counts at scale, and to 
provide visualisation of log statistics. 
B. Log Storage in the Cloud 
 In addressing the persistence of firewall logs, two 
possibilities present themselves. Namely, logs may be 
persisted in the Hadoop File System (HDFS) or in 
MongoDB. While the former possibility scales, it would not 
be meaningful to persist log counts. In order to generate log 
counts from HDFS, the raw log files would need to be 
parsed and processed in a batch-like MapReduce manner. 
Rather, HDFS is nominated to store raw logs for auditing 
purposes, but not for processing and visualization purposes. 
Each node within the cloud stores its logs locally on HDFS. 
 MongoDB presents an elegant solution when used with 
prudence. It is infeasible to store raw log lines in MongoDB, 
firstly because it would incur sizeable writes, and secondly 
because the raw logs contain redundant fields. Instead, the 
approach is taken to parse raw log lines and update log 
counts by relevant fields in MongoDB. Furthermore, 
MongoDB scales horizontally to meet the needs of 
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distributed systems, making it a suitable solution. In the 
cloud infrastructure, a single MongoDB is sharded over all 
nodes in the network (See Figure 1).  
C. Log Propagation in the Cloud 
 While all nodes can theoretically make a connection to 
MongoDB within the cloud, it is infeasible for each node to 
write to MongoDB. This approach would generate much 
overhead and MongoDB would continually have to keep the 
database consistent. Consequently, it can be expected that 
performance will suffer greatly. Instead, we opt for an 
approach which minimizes the amount of connections 
needed to write to MongoDB, and a form of log propagation 
is used.  
 In general terms, cloud architectures are composed of 
controller and compute nodes. OpenStack is one such 
example [23]. Controller nodes typically expose cloud 
application programmer interfaces (APIs) for launching 
compute instances on compute nodes. In the interest of high 
availability, these responsibilities can shift if a particular 
node fails. The cloud infrastructure of Nimbula follows this 
model, and is such that a hierarchy of node responsibilities 
exist in three tiers. In reference to Figure 1, site nodes reside 
at the top of the hierarchy (purple), followed by cluster 
nodes (blue). These are analogous to controller nodes. 
Standard nodes, analogous to compute nodes, are labeled in 
green. 
Figure 1: Log propagation architecture 
 In this configuration, all nodes log local system messages, 
and only warning logs are propagated to higher tiers in a 
bottom-up manner. Firegaze makes use of this log 
propagation model to forward raw iptables logs, with a few 
modifications. Cluster nodes (in the middle tier) carry the 
responsibility of parsing, filtering, and inserting local and 
received firewall logs into MongoDB. A single cluster node 
suffices for servicing  hundreds to thousands of standard 
node logs, which drastically lowers the amount of 
connections required to the database. Figure 2 illustrates the 
logging services we expect on cluster nodes. It maintains a 
logging daemon, an instance of the sharded MongoDB, an 
instance of the shared HDFS, and a log handler. Standard 
nodes run the same services, but do not process logs. 
Figure 2: Cluster node services 
 Site nodes (at the top of the hierarchy) are relieved from 
performing the role of processing logs,  since they are 
responsible for critical administrative operations in the 
cloud. Therefore, site nodes propagate their iptables logs to 
an appropriate cluster node. Site nodes run the same services 
as standard nodes, with the addition of providing a web 
front-end for Firegaze (see Figure 3). The web front-end is 
composed of multiple views, with tabular and graphical 
representations of firewall metrics.  
Figure 3: Site node front-end services 
 In summary, all nodes in the cloud (including standard 
nodes) share a single, sharded MongoDB instance. However, 
cluster nodes are the only entities which ever write to 
MongoDB, and site nodes are the only entities which query 
MongoDB and visualises data.  
D. Data Information Model and Visualisation 
 The design of log processing and storage enables the 
visualisation of log attributes, the most pertinent of which 
include  
• IPs with the highest number of packet counts
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• IPs with the highest number of ports in use
• Packet counts for specific IPs by destination and
source port 
• The number of ports in use for specific IPs.
 Additionally, Firegaze allows the user to query these 
criteria by varying time granularities and direction. 
Conceptually, queries select relevant dimensions of the data 
model presented in Figure 4.  
Figure 4: Dimensional breakdown of log data 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
 The implementation comprises a front-end which issues 
queries and performs visualisation, as well as a back-end 
which maintains log collection, processing, and serving 
queries. The back-end is implemented in Python, and 
interacts with MongoDB through the PyMongo API. 
Rsyslog is the logging daemon which runs on each node, and 
performs log forwarding. The front-end is written in HTML, 
PHP, and JavaScript. Data visualization is performed by 
Highcharts. 
A. Back-end 
 Configuration files for Rsyslog are modified for each 
node to allow the propagation of iptables log messages, 
which are identified by a string tag. All packets passing 
through the ethernet interfaces of the nodes are assigned this 
tag by additional rules in the INPUT and OUTPUT chains of 
iptables. Logs received at the cluster node are sent to a 
named pipe, at which point logs are processed by a Python 
module. This module strips unnecessary data, extracts the 
relevant fields, and writes to the appropriate documents in 
the database. 
 Database document design forms a critical part of the 
solution, and MongoDB affords a novel way to construct a 
document schema according to a pre-aggregated reports 
design pattern, which lends itself particularly well to storing 
log counts. To elaborate further, MongoDB is a non-
relational, document store database. In discussing the 
construction of database documents, consider the following 
raw log: 
Nov 1 15:25:15 user kernel: [16479.817936] FWLOG=OUT 
IN= OUT=eth0 SRC=10.0.2.15 DST=146.232.20.10 
LEN=60 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=64 ID=0 DF 
PROTO=UDP SPT=2666 DPT=53 LEN=40 
We are interested in storing counts for important fields, 
for example: 
• FWLOG, the direction of the packet
• SRC, the source IP address
• DST, the destination IP address
• SPT, the source port
• DPT, the destination port,
• PROTO, the protocol
With pre-aggregated reports, attributes in the documents 
are preemptively generated for varying time granularities, 
whose counts are incremented as logs are processed. The 
incentive for doing so is to maximize performance for 
queries on a per-document basis. 
In MongoDB, multiple documents form a collection. 
Consider that we have a collection which stores incoming 
packet counts for all IPs at an hour and minute level 
granularity. In the collection, there exists one document per 
unique destination IP (DST) per day. Thus, the document 
key is composed jointly of the DST, and the current day. In 
this document, we wish to record the packet counts 
according to varying destination ports (DPT), and source IPs 
(SRC). This is done via nested attributes for every hour and 
minute of the day. Figure 5 presents such a document. 
{ "IP" : "192.168.1.10", 
 "_id" : "192.168.1.10/20121023",  
 "date" : ISODate("2012-10-23T00:00:00Z"), 
 "hour" : { "13" : { "ports" : { "total" : 151,  
 "443" : 151 }, 
     "srcs" : { "197-142-111-2" : 151 } } }, 
 "minute" : { "13" : { "57" : { "ports" : { "total" : 99, 
     "443" : 99 },  
 "srcs" : { "197-142-111-2" : 99 } }, 
 "59" : { "ports" : { "total" : 52, 
     "443" : 52 },  
 "srcs" : { "197-142-111-2" : 52 } } } } 
} 
Figure 5: MongoDB document schema for iptables logs 
For example, from the document in Figure 5, we can 
derive that 99 packets were received by 192.168.1.10 on 
port 443 from a single source 197.142.111.2, at 13:57. 
Importantly, if an incoming log line is parsed which matches 
the document key, the count of the destination packet is 
incremented via an upsert operation. 
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Note that the minute attribute is split into hourly fields for 
optimization. Due to MongoDB's implementation, which 
stores values sequentially, supplying an hour field allows it 
to skip over a maximum of 23 values when updating a 
minute value, as opposed to a maximum of 1439 values if 
we stored a separate field for each minute of the day.  
Firegaze extends the idea of the document design to cater 
for monthly counts, and out-going packets. Documents are 
therefore segregated into four collections, which contain 
incoming and outgoing packet counts for daily and monthly 
time granularities. Separate collections allow for querying 
fewer documents when visualising metrics. 
B. Front-end 
 The web-based front-end provides tabular representations 
of packet and port counts, as well as a dynamic graph which 
plots metrics at varying granularities (enabled by zooming). 
This functionality is made available by Highcharts, a 
Javascript charting engine, in conjunction with asynchronous 
loading of data points via queries to MongoDB.  
 Asynchronous loading allows for a flexible, efficient way 
to view millions of data points over varying time resolutions. 
For example, it is infeasible to plot data points at a minute-
level granularity for a time-span of a month, as this would 
require in excess of 2.5 million data points to be rendered on 
a single chart. However, by imposing resolution constraints, 
the visualisation technique afforded by asynchronous 
loading makes viewing millions of data points manageable. 
By zooming and panning across a chart in Firegaze, a user 
can view 
• Minutely data for a time-span of two days
• Hourly data for a time-span of two weeks
• Daily data for up to two years
V. EVALUATION 
A. Application in the Cloud 
 As a prototype solution, results on the cloud proved 
promising. The test system consisted of 5 nodes running 
Nimbula Director 2.0. The nodes operated in a restricted IP 
space on Amazon EC2. After configuration, the back-end 
system performed reliably without incident for two weeks.  
 The resource footprint encountered during this time 
revealed significant insights. Namely, it is very effective to 
store log counts and metrics in a compressed form in 
MongoDB, as opposed to analyzing raw log formats. 
 Quantitatively, raw IP log generation averaged about 200 
MB per hour per node, equating to 5 GB per day. Over a 
period of two weeks and 5 nodes, this implies a size of 
approximately 350 GB of logs. However, because only log 
counts are stored, this data becomes massively compressed 
after processing: the total MongoDB size converted to 
BSON format is roughly 20 MB in size. This small size is 
due in part to the fact that only 5 significant IPs were 
monitored, with low interaction from the Internet in general. 
However, it should be expected that the high ratio of 
compression is maintained in proportion to the amount of 
bandwidth across interfaces, and not in proportion to the 
number of unique IPs. 
 In terms of limitations, consideration should be given to 
the bandwidth usage when propagating logs. While Rsyslog 
allows compression of logs, compression on a single log line 
may not justify incurring CPU overhead. With the figures 
above, a single node would use around 0.5 Mbps, and at first 
impression, this doesn’t seem like much on a 100 Mbps 
connection. However, it is expected that the bandwidth 
requirement will increase as more nodes are added to the 
network. One method of mitigating this is to filter logging of 
known high-bandwidth ports such as those used by Rsyslog 
and MongoDB. 
B. Application for finding Anomalies 
 Firegaze performed admirably with logs of known 
incidents made available by The Honeynet Project. One of 
the scans [7] were used for this purpose. IPs of highest threat 
could be clearly identified, as well as the ports that lead to 
compromise of certain hosts. For example, the graph in 
Figure 6 reveals the date and nature of compromise on one 
such host. 
 Anomalous activity was also identified while running 
Firegaze in real-time on a single EC2 node. It was observed 
that at one point a brute-force SSH (Secure Shell) attack 
bombarded port 22 for approximately 3 hours. Similar 
attempts were found to originate from various IP sources at 
different times.  
Figure 6: Firegaze visualisation of anomalous activity 
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VI. CONCLUSION
 Firegaze demonstrates the value that can be derived from 
simple iptables logs at a relatively low cost. It presents a 
strong argument for processing of logs whereby counts are 
stored in a compressed manner in a distributed, cloud 
environment. Efficient querying across varying time 
granularities is afforded by an appropriate document 
schema. While time-series data is, and will continue to be,  a 
challenging form of data, it was demonstrated that it is 
worthwhile processing and visualising firewall logs. Further 
use of Firegaze as a forensic tool is also effective, as it can 
assist in identifying and visualising network activity in 
response to incidents. 
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